INDO-CHINA BORDER - The most violent border clash in decades between China and India occurred last week. Is war between the world's two most populous nations really possible? Probably not, but the growing tension between them is reflective of the evolving power balance throughout Asia, experts say. Chinese military and diplomatic influence are surging throughout the region while India, backed heavily by the Trump administration, is increasingly poised as the West's strategic counterweight. Ongoing low-level conflict, accompanied by occasional flashpoints and hostilities that fall short of open war, may be inevitable now.

India Chinese Military March in Tandem, Photo Source Edtimes.in.jpg — India Chinese Military March in Tandem, Photo Source Edtimes.in

Ostensibly, last week's skirmish occurred because India discovered that China had built two tents and observation towers on the Indian side of the historical Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates the two countries. Earlier, China had brought in pieces of machinery, cut a trail into a Himalayan mountainside, and may have even dammed a river, satellite pictures suggest. That would constitute an open breach of the LAC agreement, and in theory, would be an act of war.

However, anticipating an Indian advance, China decided to pull back its forces, leaving the tents and towers behind. The Indian army soon destroyed the structures, but according to Beijing, unlawfully crossed into China to confront its troops.

The ensuing clash involving some 900 soldiers did not, in fact, include shooting. Under current rules of engagement, Chinese and Indian soldiers are supposed to keep their rifles slung on their backs. The two sides, armed with little more than spike-studded batons and rocks, squared off, leaving 20 soldiers dead. China also captured 10 Indian soldiers, who were released within a day after hastily arranged negotiations.

At one level, the outbreak of open hostilities is something of a shocker. It' s been 50 years since China and India last clashed – in 1967, over the disputed Kashmir region. An earlier conflict occurred in 1962, in part due to India recognition of the Dali Lama in Tibet and its refusal to allow Chinese patrols along its claimed border. In that era, the Soviet Union and China were competing for global influence. With growing Sino-Indian tension, Moscow made a significant effort to support India, notably with the sale of advanced MiG fighter-aircraft. In response, the United States and Britain refused to sell advanced weaponry to India, causing it to side formally with the Soviet Union in the deepening Cold War.

But the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the ever-expanding economic influence of China and the rise of the Asian Pacific as a renewed zone of geopolitical competition has altered this calculus. The West, anxious to protect its long-standing allies from China's robust expansion, has been searching for a new strategic partner. And with Japan's persistent reluctance to increase defense spending, successive American administrations, starting with President Obama's, have been forced to look elsewhere.

Almost out of nowhere, India, which in 2014 elected its first conservative government overturning decades of entrenched center-left rule, has emerged as the perfect ally.

The new Indian-American alliance has proceeded rapidly under the Trump administration, which has made no secret of its desire to transform the world's largest democracy into a bulwark against Chinese ambitions. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi rolled out the red carpet for Trump during the American president's high-level visit to Delhi in late February when the two leaders announced that Delhi planned to purchase some $3 billion worth of U.S.-made military helicopters for its navy and additional Apaches.

Already, the new Indo-American alliance has yielded a 2016 military base-sharing agreement, transfers of sensitive defense technologies, and increasingly routine cooperation in military exercises.

The United States wants India to remain the Pacific's dominant maritime power and is also investing in India border security, which, over time, could implicate America in Delhi's never-ending border conflicts with China.

Still, India is playing a cagey game. It cannot afford an open conflict with China any more than the United States can. And with continuing internal conflict in the Kashmir region and with its Muslim minorities, as well as its long rivalry with Pakistan, the country has pressing security needs elsewhere.

Even as the two countries spar over their long-standing territorial disputes, India and Chian continue to explore avenues for cooperation. After the 6th Annual China India Economic Summit held last September, Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for the first time to establish a high-level economic and trade dialogue mechanism. The two leaders also agreed to designate 2020 as the beginning of a new era of cultural and people-to-people exchanges, with 70 events scheduled to mark the 70th anniversary of China-India diplomatic ties.

Thanks to the latest border dispute, these friendly engagements have been placed on hold for the time being. Looking ahead, one should expect more low-level saber-rattling between China and India, accompanied by high-flown diplomatic rhetoric, but still carefully calibrated to avoid escalation. Not surprisingly, the Trump administration, which publicly siding with India in last week's border dispute, also disavowed any intent to intervene, calling it a matter for India to decide. And Beijing, for its part, has also downplayed the incident, abandoning its traditional efforts to portray fallen Chinese soldiers as national "martyrs."

This may well be the new face of "Cool" War in the Pacific-- or perhaps "Hot" Diplomacy would be more accurate. Amid the flurry of charges and counter-charges, there is simply too much at stake economically for America, India, and China to allow their inevitable tensions to escalate into prolonged hostilities and outright war. To be sure, battles of the kind that occurred last week could result in unintended military escalation and more considerable diplomatic fallout. And should that happen, India could find itself pushed, willy-nilly, into a full-throated embrace of the West.

For now, though, all parties are keeping their options open. After all, there's a critical American presidential campaign underway, and Trump might well lose reelection. That would give pro-Chinese forces within the US government a new opening. It would likely lead to some changes in American diplomatic posturing toward China and less open hostility on trade. Paradoxically, it won't lessen the need for a China containment strategy, one which may require an increasingly well-armed, if militarily constrained, India at its core. It may even heighten that need.